大灾小赔,小灾大赔:保费补贴“包干制”模式下的农业生产风险与赔付水平悖论——以政策性玉米保险为例

The Paradox of Agricultural Production Risk and Compensation Level in China’s Agricultural Insurance Subsidy: Evidence from Maize Insurance

本文基于中国现行的农业保险保费补贴“包干制”,通过构建农业保险公司的赔付决策模型,对当前保费补贴模式引发中国农业保险赔需错位问题进行了理论阐释,并通过2008-2019年省级政策性玉米保险数据验证了“包干制”保费补贴模式引起赔付水平与生产风险反向变动的假说。研究发现,现有的农业保险保费补贴方式会导致玉米干旱风险变化不能得到保险赔付水平的同向反应,基于不同干旱指标的检验结果均支持这一结论。从机制上来说,农业保险公司可以利用保费补贴在管理费用和纯保费之间灵活分配的权限,优先使用保费补贴支付农业保险经营管理费用,这会导致保险赔付空间被挤占,反而降低赔付支出,引致保险赔付水平与生产者实际保障需求错位,最终偏离农业保险的风险管理目标。

Based on China’s overall rationing system of agricultural insurance subsidies,this article analyzes how the compensation model of insurers’overhead costs contribute to the disruption of agricultural insurance in China.Technically,this study takes maize insurance as an example,and empirically examines the payment from insurance companies to maize producers under different drought levels.The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between the drought and the insurance company payment levels,which warns a misalignment of the insurance compensation level and the actual protection for producers.