奖惩机制下铅蓄电池生产商实施EPR的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of EPR implementation by lead battery producers under reward and punishment mechanism

在废旧铅蓄电池逆向物流系统构建中,针对地方政府和生产商博弈关系的研究不多。为探究在EPR(生产者责任延伸)制度下地方政府和铅蓄电池生产商之间的关系,分别在静态和动态奖惩机制下构建了地方政府和铅蓄电池生产商演化博弈模型,研究政府监管对生产商实施EPR制度的影响。结果表明:在静态奖惩机制下,双方演化策略呈周期恶性循环,博弈系统处于极不稳定状态;在动态奖惩机制下,双方策略达到演化稳定状态,地方政府对生产商实施EPR起主导性作用。政府监管成本下降和政府奖惩力度增大,生产商实施EPR的意愿会增强;政府监管成本下降、政府奖惩力度减弱以及生产商实施EPR的难度系数增大,地方政府会更倾向于积极监管。

A game model between local government and lead-acid battery producers is constructed based on the noncooperative evolutionary game theory.Then this paper uses a system dynamics method to simulate and analyze the proposed game model.It attempts to discuss the internal mechanism and government supervision mode that affect lead-acid battery producers to implement EPR.The result of the research shows that:The reward and punishment mechanism has an important influence on the strategic choice of lead-acid battery producers.To pursue their interests,the evolutionary strategy of the two parties under the static reward and punishment mechanism is extremely unstable.The government’s rewards and punishments to lead-acid battery producers should be related to the probability of EPR implementation.Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,the evolutionary trajectories of local governments and lead-acid battery producers revolve around and approach spirally the only evolutionarily stable strategy.Dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms can effectively solve the problem of unstable behavior strategy restricted by static reward and punishment mechanisms.The increase of government rewards and punishments will help lead-acid battery producers prefer to implement EPR,but the increase of rewards and punishments will not help the government to fulfill its regulatory responsibilities.The decrease of government supervision cost will help the government to be more inclined to active supervision,but the lower supervision cost may face imperfect reward and punishment measures,which will reduce the willingness of lead-acid battery producers to implement EPR.The increase in the degree of difficulty for lead-acid battery producers to implement EPR will make the government more proactive in supervision.When the difficulty coefficient of implementing EPR increases,lead-acid battery producers will not actively implement EPR to avoid risks.The government should increase the incentive mechanism for lead-acid battery producers and actively support them to implement EPR.