互联网金融创新监管的多阶段博弈规律研究--基于平台异质性的市场反应分析

Research on the Multi-stage Game Law of Internet Financial Innovation Supervision:Analysis of Market Response based on Platform Heterogeneity

聚焦P2P行业监管发展历程的经验教训总结,重点关注行业监管政策阶段性调整对不同资本类型P2P平台市场表现的异质性影响,以探讨新兴金融创新模式监管政策体系建设的动态调整依据及规律。首先,基于监管政策演变及平台异质性特征构建“监管方—平台方”的多阶段动态演化博弈模型,分析了监管政策调整框架下不同资本类型平台的异质性市场反应路径。其次,通过对2014—2019年P2P平台真实市场表现数据的统计分析,验证了演化博弈模型的结果推论。最后,构建了“监管方—平台方”之间决策效用的动态优化推演模型,以进一步探索博弈双方决策效用的周期变动、强度迁移以及多层次治理规律,并据此从风险事前防范、事中管控、事后处置与分析角度为新兴金融创新模式发展的有效监管提出政策建议。

Considering that the financial innovation risk sheds its influence in an evolutionary and systematic way,this research explores the heterogeneous response of P2P platforms with different ownership structures in the regulatory process with the evolutionary game method,by which we are able to analyze the process,evidences,and thus laws of the dynamic adjustment of regulatory policy systems for the emerging financial innovation.Firstly,based on the identification of the regulatory policy’s evolutionary characteristics and the platform heterogeneity aroused from their different ownership structures,we build a multi-stage dynamic evolutionary game model,in which regulators and platforms are included as the two sides of the game,and we analyze the heterogeneous market responses of P2P platforms with different ownership structures along with the change of regulatory policies.Secondly,by conducting the statistical analysis with the market performance data of P2P platforms ranging from 2014 to 2019,we verify the inference results of the evolutionary game model.Thirdly,we construct the dynamic optimization deduction model between regulators and platforms to explore the optimized decision-making utility and the adjustment direction for regulators.The results show that,first,facing the changes in supervision intensity,P2P platforms with different ownership structures will present heterogeneous strategic responses.Second,it contributes to the reduction of accumulation cycle of systematic risks and its adverse effects for regulators to establish a basic regulatory framework and release high-intensity supervisory signals promptly at the initial development stage of industry.Third,maintaining stable supervision intensity at the latter stage of industrial development would help regulators sustain their supervision outcomes.Fourth,the multi-level supervision system which could capture the diversity of regulated entities is conducive to realizing both policy fairness and supervision effectiveness.Based on our results,this paper provides policy implications in terms of ex ante risk prevention,in-process risk management,and ex-post risk disposal and analysis,by which the emerging financial innovation could be effectively supervised.This paper attempts to break through the static analysis paradigm from the dynamic perspective,and adopts the heterogeneity assumption rather than the homogeneity assumption that previous game relationship researches mainly used.Specifically,this paper explores the dynamic changes of regulatory policies through the industry cycles divided by the evolution characteristics of regulatory policies.In the meantime,it defines platforms’systematic risks by the characteristics indicated with their ownership structures.In this way,the heterogeneous responses of P2P platforms existing in the adjustment process of regulatory policies are clarified,thus providing a new idea to study the evolution of relevant policies in the future.The failure of the P2P mode is not the doom of financial innovation.In fact,the new proposal for the regulator platform game will progressively emerge along with the generation of new financial innovation.In this case,the regulator-platform game rules in the development process of P2P industry and optimization deduction based on this provide lessons for China’s financial supervision authorities to identity risks,formulate policies and review related events,which is conducive to improving the risk prevention and the financial innovation governance abilities of China.