管理层股权激励会降低公司慈善捐赠吗?

Does Top Management Stock Option Incentives Reduce Corporate Charitable Donation?

鼓励并引导公司积极开展慈善捐赠活动,是当前我国协调三次分配、促进共同富裕的重要内容。基于对上市公司股权激励核心特征的分析,本文提出了管理层在公司慈善捐赠中的权衡假说,并通过实证方法考察了管理层股权激励对公司不同类别慈善捐赠的影响。结果显示,随着管理层股权激励强度的提高,管理层机会主义慈善捐赠显著下降,而公司战略性慈善捐赠没有显著变化。进一步研究发现,在融资约束较严重、代理成本较高、股价崩盘风险较高和信息透明度较高的公司中,股权激励对管理层机会主义慈善捐赠的负向作用更为明显,同时当公司面临较高的股价崩盘风险时,管理层倾向于增加公司战略性慈善捐赠以稳定股价。本文从慈善捐赠视角拓展了股权激励的经济后果研究,为消除管理层因行权业绩条件压力而选择降低公司社会责任承担的顾虑提供了重要的经验证据。

Encouraging and guiding companies to actively carry out charitable donation activities is currently an important part of our country s coordination of three distributions and promotion of common prosperity.Based on the analysis of the core characteristics of listed company s equity incentives,this paper puts forward the hypothesis of management s balance in corporate charitable donations,and examines the impact of management s equity incentives on the company s different types of charitable donations through empirical methods.The results show that with the increase in the intensity of management s equity incentives,management s opportunistic charitable donations have dropped significantly,while the company s strategic charitable donations have not changed significantly.Further research found that in companies with more severe financing constraints,higher agency costs,higher risk of stock price collapse and higher information transparency,the negative effect of equity incentives on management s opportunistic charitable donations is more obvious.When the risk of stock price collapse is high,the management tends to increase the company s strategic charitable donations to stabilize the stock price.This paper expands the study of the economic consequences of equity incentives from the perspective of charitable donations,and provides important empirical evidence for eliminating concerns of executives who choose to reduce the company s social responsibility due to the pressure of performance conditions.