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理性的直觉:符号活动的主体性问题研究 被引量:2

Rational Intuition:A Study of Semiosic Subjectivity
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摘要 科学研究通常强调研究的客观性,排斥任何主观性的干扰,而符号学研究则不可能不考虑人的主观作用。虽然社会发展与文艺创作均具有一定的客观规律,但任何规律似乎又无法摆脱人的主观性。究竟应该如何避免研究的主观性或曰主体性所造成的片面性,尽可能保证科学研究的客观性呢?精神文化符号学立足于中国传统文化,尤其是老庄哲学,在人的主体有无之境的不断转化中,寻求客观性,努力避免因人类理性思维的“自负”所造成的归纳和推理的片面性,消除因已有知识所形成的具体概念和形象的约束,避免由此可能产生的“遮蔽”现象,从而进入“理性的直觉”状态,重归人的自然存在模式,为符号学研究探索一条建立在理性基础之上的直觉把握符号意义的路径。 Scientific research usually emphasizes objectivity unaffected by any form of subjectivity.By comparison,however,semiotic inquiries must consider the role of subjectivity.Although social devel-opment,art,and literature all follow certain rules of objectivity,these rules seem to be inescapably linked to the subjectivity of human beings.How do we avoid the subjectivity of research,or research biases caused by subjectivity,to ensure the objectivity of scientific research to the greatest possible extent?The present paper answers this question through cultural semiotics of Jingshen,which is grounded in Chinese cultural traditions,especially the philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi.This line of inquiry seeks to identify objectivity in the constant transformation between the subject's states of self and selflessness,while striving to avoid inductive and deductive biases caused by the“conceit”of rationality and eliminate the constraints of specific concepts and images formed by existing knowledge as well as possible consequential“Verborgenheit”.The purpose is to get into a state of“rational intui-tion”,returning to the natural mode of human existence and forging for semiotics a rationality-based path to intuitive understanding of meaning.
作者 张杰 ZHANG Jie(School of Foreign Languages and Cultures,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023)
出处 《南京师大学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第3期142-148,共7页 Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Social Science Edition)
基金 国家社科基金重点项目“19世纪俄罗斯文学体裁演变史研究”(21AWW004)的阶段性研究成果。
关键词 符号学 主体性 理性的直觉 老子 庄子 semiotics subjectivity rational intuition Laozi Zhuangzi
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