论公司对赌义务履行的绝对性--以反思“九民纪要”第5条为线索

On the Absoluteness to Carry Out Obligations of the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism:Rethinking Article 5 of the Minutes of the National Civil and Commercial Trial Work Meeting

股权回购与减资绑定的裁判路径容易侵损公司法人独立性、扭曲合同机制。法官裁判对赌协议履行可能性容易造成司法过度介入公司。对赌失败后,投资方作为目标公司的小股东和债权人,与目标公司及其原始股东利益对立,所以董事会、股东会也均不应为协议履行可能性的判断主体。主张由董事会判断的观点亦存在混同投资方权益与优先股、误读意思表示理论的法理缺陷。基于债的履行障碍法的体系秩序,资本维持原则不宜作为合同程式中履行不能的法律原因。是故无需判断协议的可履行性,法院应直接判定协议的履行,以避免对公司形成过度保护。应对实在的而不是抽象的债权人进行保护,让债权人参与到程序中:对于股权回购型对赌,公司应履行减资程序;对于金钱补偿型对赌,公司应偿还债务,具体根据破产标准和履行是否损及股本,呈现公司进入破产程序、完全履行、部分履行(一时不能)三种状态。

The judging approach of the binding of stock repurchase and capital reduction is easy to damage the independence of corporate and distort the contract mechanism.The judge determines the possibility of performance of valuation adjustment mechanism(VAM) is easy to cause excessive judicial intervention in the company.After the failure of VAM,the investor has the dual identities of the target company’s minority shareholders and creditors.The interests of the investor are opposed to the target company and the original shareholders of the company,therefore,neither the shareholders meeting nor the board of directors should be the qualified body of judging the possibility of fulfilling VAM.Therefore,there is no need to judge the performance of the agreement,the court should directly judge the performance of the agreement,so as to avoid excessive protection of the company.It should protect real creditors rather than abstract creditors and let creditors participate in the procedure.For the share repurchase type VAM,the company should perform the capital reduction procedure.For the money compensation type VAM,the company should repay the debt.According to the bankruptcy standard and whether the performance would cause loss to the paid-in capital,three states will be presented:the company into bankruptcy proceedings,full performance,part performance(temporarily unable).