环境规制执行互动与城市群污染治理

Implementation interaction of environmental regulations and pollution control in urban agglomerations

随着城市群成为中国新型城镇化的主要空间组织形态,以城市群为地理空间尺度的环境合作治理变得愈发重要。研究城市间的环境规制执行互动行为能够为城市群污染治理竞合关系提供新的解释。该研究选取市场激励型、命令控制型及组合型三类环境规制政策手段,构建相应理论机制并运用两区制空间Durbin模型分析了不同类型环境规制在中国103个重点城市间的执行互动形态。进一步利用SLX模型探讨了执行互动形态对5大城市群污染合作治理的影响。研究发现:市场激励型环境规制存在非完全执行现象,在部分城市间呈现为“逐底竞赛”的互动形态。在叠加实施命令控制型环境规制后,城市间执行互动形态由“逐底竞赛”转为“竞相向上”。这一互动特征的转变在长三角和成渝城市群尤为显著。进一步研究发现,这两大城市群同为“竞相向上”的执行互动形态却对其城市间环境合作产生了截然不同的效果:长三角城市群“协同治理”效果显著,城市间环境规制存在较强外溢效应;成渝城市群则不存在“协同治理”效果,其“竞相向上”的执行互动形态更多发挥本地效应,倾向于独立减排而非城市间协同减排。

As urban agglomerations have become the main spatial organization form in China, it is of great significance to carry out environmental cooperative governance based on urban agglomerations. Research on the interaction of environmental regulation enforcement among cities can provide a new explanation for the competition and cooperation in terms of pollution control in urban agglomerations. This article selected three types of environmental regulation policy tools: market-incentive, command-and-control, and their combinations, and analyzed the interaction pattern of environmental regulations based on the theoretical mechanism derivation and the twozone spatial Durbin model by using the panel data of 103 cities in China. Then, the SLX model was used to explore the impact of the interaction of environmental regulations on the cooperative governance of pollution in five urban agglomerations. The results showed that the market-incentive environmental regulation was not fully implemented, which meant that some cities adopted a ‘race to the bottom’strategy in response of the competition with their neighbors. After combining market-incentive environmental regulation with commandand-control environmental regulation, the pattern of environmental regulation interaction between cities changed from ‘race to the bottom’ to ‘race to the top’. This interactive characteristic was particularly significant in the Yangtze River Delta and the ChengduChongqing urban agglomerations. However, the ‘racing to the top’ characteristic of these two urban agglomerations had different effects on the intercity environmental cooperation: there was a synergy effect caused by strong spillover effect of environmental regulation implementation in the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration rather than in the Chengdu-Chongqing urban agglomeration.