摘要
针对乡村振兴过程中乡村人才与地方政府合作不够协调这一现实问题,提出采用演化博弈的理论方法,通过建立乡村人才与地方政府演化博弈模型,分析了博弈双方在不同情况下的合作演化路径。研究结果表明:博弈双方的最终演化结果与初始合作意向、投入成本、收益分配系数相关,提高双方初始合作意向值、降低投入成本、合理制定收益分配系数有助于双方达成合作,应增加政府对乡村基层建设的补贴,建立完善的基层管理制度,提高乡村人才参与度,创新乡村人才选拔机制与参与模式。
Based on the research background of“revitalization of talents”in rural revitalization strategy,this paper puts forward the theoretical method of evolutionary game regarding the fact that the cooperation between rural talents and local governments is not coordinated enough during the process of rural revitalization.The paper analyzes the evolution path of cooperation between both sides in different situations by establishing an evolutionary game model of“rural talents and local governments”.The results show that the final evolution results of both sides of the game are related to the initial cooperation intention,input cost and coefficient of income distribution.Increasing the initial cooperation intention value,reducing the input cost and formulating the coefficient of income distribution properly can help both sides reach cooperation.Therefore,this paper puts forward some suggestions on countermeasures for grassroots governments and rural talents:increasing government subsidies for the building of rural grassroots units,establishing sophisticated grassroots management system,improving participation of rural talents and innovating the selection mechanism and participation mode of rural talents.
作者
王晓燕
WANG Xiao-yan(School of Marxism, Xuzhou University of Technology,Xuzhou 221018, China)
出处
《南京工程学院学报(社会科学版)》
2022年第1期78-83,共6页
Journal of Nanjing Institute of Technology:Social Science Edition
基金
2021年度江苏省社科应用研究精品工程人才发展专项课题“江苏人才助力乡村振兴的案例研究”(21SRC-08)。
关键词
乡村振兴
演化博弈
乡村人才
合作
rural revitalization
evolutionary game
rural talents
cooperation