紧缩性货币政策下控股股东股权质押及其经济后果

Tight Monetary Policy, Equity Pledge of Controlling Shareholders of Enterprises and Its Economic Consequences

本文基于质押比例、私利侵占与违规行为视角,考察紧缩性货币政策导致流动性压力增大时企业控股股东股权质押受到的影响及其经济后果。研究发现,紧缩性货币政策条件下,股权质押企业会削减质押比例,使得控股股东私利侵占行为有所减少,同时对违规行为起到显著抑制作用。进一步研究表明,二级市场股票流动性对货币政策的治理效应产生影响:在股票流动性低的组别,其对质押企业私利侵占的治理效应更强;在股票流动性高的组别,紧缩货币政策对质押率的负向影响更大,对质押企业违规行为的正向治理效应更强。本文还证实了在紧缩货币政策背景下,货币政策的正向治理效应最终能够显著提升质押企业业绩。

Based on the perspective of pledge ratio,private interest encroachment and violations,this paper examines the impact and economic consequences of equity pledge of enterprise controlling shareholders when liquidity pressure increases due to tight monetary policy.The study found that under the condition of tight monetary policy,equity pledge enterprises will reduce their pledge proportion,reduce the private interest encroachment of controlling shareholders,and significantly inhibit violations.Further research shows that the secondary market stock liquidity has an impact on the governance effect of monetary policy:in the group with low stock liquidity,it has a stronger governance effect on the private interest encroachment of pledge enterprises;In the group with high stock liquidity,tightening monetary policy has a greater negative impact on the pledge rate and a stronger positive governance effect on the violations of pledge enterprises.Furthermore,the study also confirms that under the background of tightening monetary policy,the positive governance effect of monetary policy can finally significantly improve the performance of pledge enterprises.