国有股权、政府隐性担保与国有企业银行贷款

State-Owned Equity,Implicit Government Guarantee, and Bank Loans in Soes

首先构建数学模型对国有企业国有股权通过政府隐性担保影响银行贷款的理论机理进行理论分析,然后以国有上市公司为样本,构建多元面板回归模型和中介效应模型实证检验国有企业国有股权经由政府隐性担保对银行贷款的影响。研究发现:政府隐性担保将对银行贷款产生显著正向影响,国有股权与政府隐性担保和银行贷款之间都呈现出显著正相关关系,政府隐性担保将在国有股权与银行贷款之间发挥中介作用;相比于地方国企,政府隐性担保在中央国企国有股权对银行贷款影响中发挥的中介效应更大。研究结果阐明了国有股权与政府隐性担保在国有企业银行贷款中的作用,为优化国有企业股权结构、规范政府隐性担保行为、推进混合所有制改革提供了理论和实证证据。

A mathematical model is constructed to analyze the theoretical mechanism that the state-owned equity of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) affects bank loans through implicit government guarantee. Then, taking listed SOEs as samples, a multiple panel regression model and an intermediary effect model are built to empirically study the influence of state-owned equity on bank loans through implicit government guarantee. It is found that implicit government guarantee will have a significant positive impact on bank loans, and the state-owned equity boosts both the implicit government guarantee and the bank loans. In addition, the implicit government guarantee will play an intermediary role between the state-owned equity and the bank loans. Moreover, compared with the local SOEs, implicit government guarantee has a more important intermediary effect in the impact of state-owned equity central SOEs on bank loans. This paper clarifies the influence of state-owned equity and implicit government guarantee on bank loans of SOEs, which provides a theoretical and empirical evidence for optimizing the equity structure of SOEs, standardizing the implicit government guarantee behavior, and promoting the reform of mixed ownership.