投资者关系管理与公司现金价值

Investor Relation Management and Corporate Cash Value

现金价值作为公司价值的重要组成部分,其影响因素一直是各界关注的焦点。已有研究主要关注内部控制制度和产品市场竞争等传统公司内外部治理机制对现金价值的影响,缺乏研究投资者关系管理这一时兴的、公司自内向外自主实施的特殊治理机制对此发挥的作用。基于委托代理理论,以2012年至2019年沪深两市A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,采用多元回归方法实证检验投资者关系管理对公司现金价值的影响;在此基础上进行分组回归,分别考察公司可视性程度和股权性质对二者之间关系的调节作用。进一步地,检验两类代理成本在投资者关系管理影响公司现金价值的过程中发挥的中介作用。此外,还拓展性地检验投资者关系管理与公司超额现金持有水平和投资效率的关系,以期从公司内、外两方面进一步验证投资者关系管理影响公司现金价值的作用机理。研究结果表明,投资者关系管理对公司现金价值具有显著的正效应,这一效应在可视性较低(即低分析师跟踪和低机构投资者持股)和非国有股权性质的公司中更为显著;机制检验的结果表明,投资者关系管理显著降低管理层和大股东的两类代理成本,继而提升公司现金价值。进一步研究发现,投资者关系管理水平越高,公司超额现金持有水平更低、投资效率更高,说明投资者关系管理能够显著抑制管理层和大股东实施利益侵占,并降低公司对外投资水平因其利益侵占而偏离最优投资水平的程度,从而为投资者关系管理正向影响现金价值的作用机理提供进一步的证据和解释。研究结果丰富了现金价值影响因素和投资者关系管理经济后果等方面的成果,并为监管部门全面评估投资者关系管理制度的经济后果,以及指导上市公司更好地开展投资者关系管理工作提供可靠的经验证据,对进一步完善公司治理、优化公司现金管理、提升公司价值进而有效保障投资者利益具有一定的指导意义。

As an important component of corporate value, the influencing factors of cash value has become the focus for both academia and industry. Yet the existing literature mainly focuses on the effect of traditional internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, such as internal control system and product market competition, on cash value. Much less attention is paid to the effect of investor relation management(IRM, a fashionable special governance mechanism implemented by companies from inside to outside) on cash value.Based on the principal-agent theory, this study uses non-financial firms listed in the A-share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2017 as research samples, and then tests the influence of IRM on cash value by conducting the multiple regression method. On this basis, this study groups the samples by the degree of corporate visibility and the property of ownership to explore the relationship between IRM and cash value. Furthermore, we explore the mediating role of the two types agency costs in the impact of IRM on the cash value. In addition, we examine the relationship between IRM and the level of excess cash holdings as well as that between IRM and the investment efficiency to further verify the specific mechanism of IRM on cash value from both internal and external perspectives.Our results indicate that IRM has a significant positive effect on cash value. This effect is more pronounced among companies with lower visibility(measured by lower analyst coverage and lower institutional ownership) and non-state ownership.The results of the mechanism test show that IRM significantly reduces the agency costs of management and major shareholders and enhances cash value consequently. Our further study finds that companies with better IRM have lower level of excess cash holdings and higher level of investment efficiency, suggesting that IRM could significantly reduce the space of interest encroaching of management and large shareholders, and reduce the deviation of the company′s investment level from the optimal level due to the interest encroaching behavior. This provides further evidence and explanation for the positive effect of IRM on cash value.This study contributes to the relevant research on the influencing factors of cash value and the economic consequences of IRM. It provides reliable empirical evidence for regulators to comprehensively evaluate the economic consequences of IRM system and to better guide the listed companies through their investor relations management. Besides, this research also has certain guiding significance to further improve corporate governance, optimize cash management, promote corporate value, and effectively protect the interests of investors.