传统权利概念的反思及其“元理论”证成——一个权利理论的新进路

Reflection on the Traditional Concept and Justifiction of Right--From the Perspective of Meta-theory

有关权利的理论解说存在利益与意志两种相互竞争的理论。权利利益论与意志论的分歧主要存在于概念层面,而非证成方面。然而,依据一般权利概念界定的要求,无论利益论还是意志论,对权利的概念性解释都存在一定困境,无法作为权利的一般性概念。从元理论层面,观念论为构想权利概念提供了基础,需要将互惠与平等而非利益与自由作为权利概念解说的前提预设。在元理论视野中,权利主要作为一种独立的规范性事业,主体在追求所珍视之物,实现人的尊严和价值时,以互惠为检验标准,以平等参与为条件。权利的概念分析是开放的,但前提是捕捉到权利话语在实践推理中的复杂方式和作用。

With regard to rights,there are two main competing theories of rights,namely,the interest and the Will Theory.From the perspective of metatheory,the debate between the theories of rights concerns the concept rather than the justification.According to the requirements of the definition of a general concept of rights,there are some difficulties in the conceptual interpretation of rights by either the interest Theory or the Will Theory,which cannot be regarded as a general concept of rights.Conceptualism provides a new perspective for conceiving the concept of rights.Rights must be pursued as an independent normative affair,in which the subjects should take reciprocity as the test standard and equal participation as the condition when they pursue what they value and realize human dignity and value.The conceptual analysis of rights is open,provided that one captures the complex way and function of the concept of rights in practical reasoning.