业绩期望落差与企业“漂绿”行为

Performance Expectation Gap and Enterprise“Greenwashing”Behavior

针对企业“漂绿”问题屡禁不止的现状,分析了业绩期望落差对企业“漂绿”行为的影响机理,并以2010—2019年A股重污染行业上市公司为样本进行实证检验。研究发现:业绩期望落差会诱发企业“漂绿”行为,且主要表现为对环境实践的选择性披露;而且,业绩期望落差持续的时间越长,其对企业“漂绿”行为的影响越显著。进一步的路径检验表明,业绩期望落差会恶化企业融资约束和加剧管理层短视,进而导致“漂绿”行为。此外,不同类型规制工具对“漂绿”的治理效应存在差异,其中,命令控制型环境规制及本地媒体监督能够抑制业绩期望落差驱动的企业“漂绿”行为,但市场激励型、公众参与型环境规制以及异地媒体监督的治理效应不明显。

Aiming at the status quo of repeated“greenwashing”behavior in enterprises,this paper empirically tests the impact of performance expectation gap on enterprise“greenwashing”behavior,using China’s A-share listed companies in heavily polluted industries from 2010 to 2019 as samples.The results show that performance expectation gap could induce enterprise“greenwashing”behavior,which is mainly manifested as the selective disclosure of environmental activities.Moreover,with the extension of performance expectation gap duration,the impact of performance expectation gap on enterprise“greenwashing”behavior would be more significant.Further mechanism test results show that the performance expectation gap could worsen enterprise financing constraints and exacerbate managers’shortsightedness,thereby affecting“greenwashing”behavior.In addition,different types of regulatory tools have different governance effects on“greenwashing”.Specifically,command-and-control environmental regulations and local media supervision can curb enterprise“greenwashing”behavior driven by performance expectation gap,while the governance effects of market incentives and public participation environmental regulations,and off-site media supervision are not significant.