上市公司CEO预期任期影响企业多元化吗?

Does CEO Expected Tenure Affect Corporate Diversification in Listed Companies?

作为掌舵人的CEO在企业战略决策中起着举足轻重的作用,然而预期任期的缩短会催化CEO私利动机和短视主义倾向,诱发更多的多元化决策,最终损害企业长期利益。基于代理理论和高阶梯队理论,以2013—2020年我国A股上市非金融企业为样本,实证研究CEO预期任期对企业多元化的影响。研究发现,CEO预期任期缩短会为企业带来更多的多元化尤其是非相关多元化,该倾向受到企业CEO决策权及企业内外部监督机制的影响,CEO持股会强化这一倾向,而机构投资者持股对CEO决策权的制约能够起到抑制作用;相较于非国有企业,国有企业严格的内部决策监督机制对CEO决策权力的监督可以有效缓解短预期任期对企业多元化的影响;包含分析师、审计师在内的外部监督机制能够有效制约短预期任期CEO的多元化倾向。

As the leader,CEO plays an important role in corporate strategic decision-making.However,the shortening of the expected tenure will catalyze CEO’s selfish motivation and shortsighted tendency,inducing more diversified decisions,and ultimately damage the long-term interests of enterprises.Based on the Agency Theory and High-echelon Theory,this paper empirically studies the impact of CEO expected tenure on corporate diversification by taking A-share listed non-financial enterprises in China from 2013 to 2020 as samples.The results show that the shortening of CEO expected tenurewill bring more diversification,especially non-related diversification,which is affected by CEO decision-making power and internal and external supervision mechanism.CEO shareholding will strengthen this tendency,and institutional investors’shareholding and participation in corporate governance can inhibit CEO decision-making power.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,strict internal decision-making management system of state-owned enterprises can effectively alleviate the impact of short expected tenure on corporate diversification.The external supervision mechanism including analysts and auditors can effectively restrict the diversification tendency of short-term CEOs.