融券卖空与信披违规:一个准自然实验的证据

Short Selling of Securities Loan and Violations of Information Disclosure:Evidence from A Quasi-natural Experiment

以我国资本市场2010年推出融券政策为视角,实证探讨了融券卖空与信息披露违规之间的关系。研究发现,融券卖空显著降低了信息披露违规倾向以及违规次数,表明融券卖空具有较好的公司治理效应。机制检验显示,融券卖空通过提高企业内部控制质量、降低大股东“掏空”动机以及降低代理成本进而降低了信息披露违规倾向及违规次数。进一步研究发现,融券卖空与信息披露违规之间的负相关关系仅在机构投资者持股比例较高组、外部审计费用较高组显著,说明融券卖空与机构投资者、外部审计之间存在互补效应。

From the perspective of China’s capital market securities loan policy launched in 2010,this paper empirically discusses the relationship between short selling of securities loan and information disclosure violations of listed companies.The research finds that short selling reduces the tendency and frequency of information disclosure violations of listed companies,indicating that short selling has a good corporate governance effect.The mechanism test shows that short selling reduces the tendency and frequency of information disclosure violations of listed companies by improving the quality of internal control of enterprises,reducing the motivation of major shareholders“tunneling”and reducing agency costs.Further research shows that short selling has a significant restraining effect on listed companies’information disclosure violations only in groups with a higher proportion of institutional investors and a higher external audit fees,indicating that short selling has complementary effects with institutional investors and external audit.