信息披露的经济学分析:预防性动机视角

Economic Analysis of Information Disclosure:A Preventive Perspective

信息披露在当前信息化的社会中是司空见惯的现象。通过建立一个信息披露的模型,提出“预防性信息披露”的概念,并用以解释现实中为什么一些信息披露的主体会主动、自愿地披露对自己不利的信息。当发送者和接收者处于严格对立的关系中时,发送者总是希望接收者拥有的信息尽可能少。在此种情况下,当他是接收者唯一可能的信息来源时,发送者不会披露任何信息;但如果接收者还能从其它渠道有成本地获取信息,那么发送者便会先发制人地主动披露一些、但不完全的信息。该信息披露的目的是防止接收者主动获取更加精确的信息,从而做出对发送者更加不利的行为。这对市场监管部门设计有效的机制让被监管者主动披露信息、降低监管成本有启示意义。

Information disclosure is a common phenomenon in the current information society.This paper studies preventive information disclosure between a sender and a receiver.When there exists strict conflict of interests,the sender is better off if the receiver has less information.In this case,if the receiver can only obtain information from the sender,then the sender would not disclose any information.However,if the receiver can also costly acquire information from other channels,then the sender would like to disclose some,but not full information.By doing so,the sender can effectively prevent the receiver from acquiring more precise information which is harmful for the sender.Our analysis also sheds light on the optimal design of regulation policies to encourage voluntary disclosure and reduce supervision costs.