农业保险公司与政府部门之间的动态博弈分析——基于前景理论视角

An Analysis on Dynamic Game between Agricultural Insurance Company and Government Department: Based on the Perspective of Prospect Theory

运用前景理论构建政府部门监管农业保险市场保险公司经营行为的前景值矩阵,建立财政补贴条件下保险公司经营行为影响模型,推理减少保险公司不规范经营行为的条件和途径,并基于现实案例分析成因。结果表明:保险公司的规范经营成本、不规范经营收益和政府部门的处罚力度等因素均显著影响其经营行为选择;由于风险规避系数不同,保险公司对农业保险经营风险的态度存在差别,政府补贴不能完全有效减少其不规范经营行为,甚至产生负面作用;现阶段政府部门的监管强度不够、处罚力度不足是农业保险公司不规范经营行为产生的主要原因。政府可通过增加监管强度、加大处罚力度对保险公司实施监管,保险公司可通过健全基层服务体系、运用先进科技手段提升农业保险供给质效。

This paper adopts prospect theory to build the prospect value matrix of business behavior of insurance company which is supervised by government departments in agricultural insurance market,construct the influencing model of insurance company s behavior under the condition of financial subsidy,gain the conditions and ways to reduce non-normative operation of insurance company,and explore its causes based on real cases.The results show that the cost of normative operation,benefit of irregular operation and penalty from government supervision will significantly affects behavioral choices of insurance company.Because of different risk aversion coefficient,there are differences in the attitudes of insurance companies to operating risk of agricultural insurance,subsidies cannot completely and effectively reduce the non-normative behavior of insurance company,and even have a negative effect.At present,inadequate supervision and insufficient punishment form government departments are the main reason for the non-standard operation of insurance companies.The government can strengthen supervision and intensify punishment to operating behavior,and insurance company can increase the quality and efficiency of agricultural insurance supply by improving the grass-roots service system and using advanced scientific and technological means.