“一带一路”倡议下中欧班列补贴退坡策略设计

Design of CR Express’s Subsidy Slope Strategy under the Background of“One Belt and One Road”

中欧班列开行数量的猛增离不开政府长久以来的财政支持,但长期看,补贴可能会产生企业依赖性增加、政府财政吃紧等弊端,补贴退坡成为中欧班列实现内涵式高质量发展的必然途径。但不当的补贴退坡策略可能会对中欧班列现有向好发展势头产生负面的消极影响,故中欧班列补贴退坡需要合理且可行的策略。本文考虑到中欧班列运营商与货主企业之间存在博弈的实际情况,构建了中欧班列运营商—货主企业两方Stackelberg博弈模型,参考实际政府补贴情形,分析了不补贴、补贴班列运营商、补贴货主企业三种情形。在充分分析补贴对中欧班列运营商、货主企业两方Stackelberg博弈影响的基础上,引入政府补贴效率、消费者补贴效率,从退坡速率、退坡临界点、退坡期三方面,分别设计了中欧班列进出口相应的补贴退坡策略。进一步地,划分中欧班列补贴全周期,提出中欧班列不同补贴期补贴政策建议。最后,通过数值分析,验证和拓展结论。研究表明:(1)补贴班列运营商和补贴货主企业两种情形下,集装箱订购数量、货物销售价格、班列运营商利润、货主企业利润等补贴效果相当,仅在运价方面存在差异;货物销售价格是补贴退坡策略设计的主要影响因素,故补贴班列运营商和补贴货主企业两种情形可使用相同的补贴退坡策略。(2)政府持续进行补贴,会引起政府补贴效率下降、消费者补贴获得率降低,这也是中欧班列补贴退坡的原因所在。(3)相比于出口,中欧班列进口补贴退坡时还需额外考虑消费者补贴获得率因素;进出口两种情况下,中欧班列补贴退坡速率相同,但退坡临界点不同,退坡期划分不同;若以合适速率进行补贴退坡可实现中欧班列市场不退化。(4)中欧班列补贴全周期可划分为成长期、成熟期、退坡期,政府应采取增加补贴、稳定补贴、补贴退坡等相应政策。在补贴退坡期,除了可采取合适补贴退坡速率逐渐降低补贴之外,助力企业扩大目标市场规模的举措可作为补贴退坡的替代政策,以此降低补贴退坡对中欧班列发展产生的冲击。

The rapid increase in the number of the China-Europe railway express is inseparable from the long-term financial support of the government.However,in the long run,subsidies may lead to disadvantages such as increased corporate dependence and tight government finances.Subsidy slope has become an inevitable way for the China-Europe railway express to achieve connotative high-quality development.However,an improper subsidy slope strategy may have a negative impact on the current positive development momentum of the China-Europe railway express.Therefore,the subsidy slope strategy needs to be reasonable and feasible.Considering the actual situation of the game between the China-Europe railway express operator and the shipper company,the paper constructed a China-Europe railway express operator-shipper stackelberg game model.With reference to the actual government subsidy situation,the three situations of non-subsidy,operator-subsidy and shipper-subsidy were analyzed.On the basis of fully analyzing the impact of subsidies on the operator-shipper stackelberg game model,the government subsidy efficiency and consumer subsidy efficiency were introduced.From the three aspects of slope decline rate,slope decline critical point,and slope decline period,the corresponding subsidy decline strategies for the import and export of the China-Europe railway express were designed respectively.Further,the full subsidy cycle of the China-Europe railway express was divided,and the subsidy policy suggestions for different subsidy periods of were put forward.Finally,through numerical analysis,the conclusions were verified and extended.The research shows:(1)In the two situations of operator-subsidy and shipper-subsidy,the subsidy effects such as the number of containers ordered,the sales price of goods,the profits of operators,and the profits of shippers are equivalent,but there are differences in freight rates.The sales price of goods is the main factor affecting the design of the subsidy slope strategy,so the same subsidy slope strategy can be used in the two situations.(2)The continuous subsidies will lead to a decrease in the efficiency of government subsidies and a reduction in the rate of consumer subsidies,which is also the reason for the slope of subsidies.(3)Compared with exports,the slope in import subsidies requires additional consideration of the rate of consumer subsidies.(4)The subsidy period can be divided into growth period,maturity period,and slope period.Correspondingly,the government should adopt policies such as increasing subsidies,stabilizing subsidies,and sloping subsidies.During the slope period,in addition to adopting a suitable subsidy slope rate to gradually reduce the subsidy,measures to help enterprises expand the target market size can be used as an alternative policy for the slope subsidy,so as to reduce the impact of the slope subsidy on the development of the China-Europe railway express.