股东网络能提高企业创新绩效吗?--两类代理成本的中介效应研究

Shareholder Network Improving Innovation Performance:The Mediating Effect of Two Types of Agency Costs

以中国2010年至2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本,运用社会网络分析(SNA)方法,研究股东网络、两类代理成本与企业创新绩效之间的关系。结果表明,股东网络有利于企业创新绩效的提高,两类代理成本在股东网络与企业创新绩效之间有部分中介效应。同时发现,第一类代理成本的中介效应低于第二类代理成本的中介效应,原因在于第一类委托代理关系中股东网络降低了股东与高管之间的信息不对称,进一步降低了第一类代理成本,从而提升了企业的创新绩效;而在第二类委托代理关系中股东网络较大幅度地增加了中小股东的谈判能力,进而降低了大股东对中小股东的剥削程度,也就降低了第二类代理成本,进而也提升了企业的创新绩效,但是第一类代理成本的降低可能小于第二类代理成本的降低。这一研究深化了股东网络与企业创新绩效的认知,细分了两类代理成本的作用机制。

Based on the sample of A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2010 to 2019,we investigate the relationship among shareholder network,two types of agency costs and innovation performance with social network analysis(SNA).The results show that shareholder network can improve innovation performance,and two types of agency costs partly mediate the relationship between shareholder network and innovation performance.We also find that the mediating effect of Agency Costs I is lower than Agency Costs II.In the first type of principal-agent relationship,shareholder network reduces the information asymmetry between shareholders and executives,thus it reduces the agency Costs I and improves the innovation performance.In the second type of principal-agent relationship,however,the reduction of Agency Costs II is implemented through which the shareholder network increases the negotiation ability of minority shareholders and reduces the exploitation of minority shareholders by large shareholders.And the reduction of Agency Costs II may be more than Agency Costs I.This study deepens the cognition of the relationship between shareholder network and innovation performance,and it also separates the mechanism of the two types of agency costs.