供应商谎报行为下生鲜农产品双渠道供应链协调研究

Research on Coordination of Dual Channel Supply Chain of Fresh Agricultural Products under Supplier Misrepresentation

电子商务迅猛发展,越来越多的供应商开通了线上销售渠道,并且通过线上渠道向购买生鲜的消费者进行销售;由于新鲜度信息不对称而造成供应商谎报其新鲜度信息进而影响供应链,所以建立供应商谎报新鲜度为主导、零售商作为跟随的生鲜二级供应链系统。基于斯坦伯格博弈,生鲜农产品构建谎报行为下的利润函数,研究供应商的谎报行为对供应商和零售商以及供应链决策和利益的影响,进一步采用价格折扣契约,对供应商谎报行为下的供应链进行协调。研究表明:价格折扣契约能够促进整体的供应链利润增加,在一定程度上解决了问题,并实现了一定程度协调。

With the rapid development of e-commerce,more and more suppliers have opened online sales channels and sold to consumers who buy fresh products through online channels.Because of the asymmetry of freshness information,suppliers lie about their freshness information and then affect the supply chain.Therefore,a two-level fresh supply chain system is established in which suppliers lie about freshness and retailers follow.Based on the Steinberg game,the profit function of fresh agricultural products under the misreporting behavior was constructed,and the influence of suppliers'misreporting behavior on suppliers and retailers as well as the decision-making and interests of supply chain was studied.Further,the price discount contract was adopted to coordinate the supply chain under suppliers'misreporting behavior.The research shows that the price discount contract can promote the profit increase of the whole supply chain,solve the problem to a certain extent,and realize the coordination to a certain extent.