摘要
We document that in China the maturity dates of bank-issued wealth management products(WMPs)cluster toward the end of a month and then decrease significantly at the beginning of the following month.Our empirical work detects a negative relationship between a bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio(LDR)at month-ends and the number of its issued WMPs expiring within several days of the month-end.Moreover,this WMP clustering and the negative relationship disappear after the reform in which regulators bring up measures for banks with a high deposit deviation degree in 2014.We also document that the banks tend to arrange the high-return WMPs to expire around month-ends to attract customers,and this clustering of high-return WMPs also disappears after the reform.Our findings suggest that banks actively,rather than passively,use WMPs as vehicles for their regulatory arbitrage or window dressing behaviours.
