分析师关注能促进企业创新吗?——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

Can analyst coverage promote firms’innovation?——Empirical evidence from listed companies in China

基于外部治理视角,利用2007—2019年中国A股非金融上市公司数据检验分析师关注能否促进企业创新。在控制内生性基础上,研究发现:分析师关注显著提高了企业创新,具体表现为分析师关注程度越高的企业,其申请专利的数量和申请专利的被引用数量越高。而进一步研究发现,分析师关注主要通过缓解企业信息不对称促进企业创新,而分析师关注给企业管理层施加的业绩压力对企业创新并没有产生显著作用。研究表明:在公司治理体系不健全的新兴市场国家,加快完善外部治理机制,特别是证券分析师的外部治理机制,对于提高我国公司治理水平、促进企业创新具有重要的意义。

Based on the perspective of external governance,this paper used the data of China’s A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2019 to test whether analyst coverage can promote firms’innovation.On the basis of controlling endogeneity,the study found that analyst coverage significantly improved firms’innovation.Specifically,the higher the degree of analyst coverage,the higher the number of patents applied and the number of patents cited.Further research showed that analyst coverage mainly promoted innovation by alleviating firms’information asymmetry,while the performance pressure exerted by analyst coverage on firms’management had no significant effect on firms’innovation.The research of this paper shows that in emerging market countries with imperfect corporate governance system,accelerating the improvement of external governance mechanism,especially the external governance mechanism of securities analysts,is of great significance in improving the level of corporate governance and promoting the innovation of firms.