生态保护红线区人为活动限制补偿监管中的利益博弈

Interest Game in the Supervision of Human Activity Restriction Compensation in the Ecological Protection Red Line Area

深入研究生态保护红线区人为活动限制补偿监管对于满足生态保护红线区生态补偿的条件性具有重要的意义。运用混合策略纳什均衡原理,构建县级政府与生态保护红线区农户的“经济人”假设博弈模型和“生态人”假设博弈模型。结果表明,两种假设博弈模型中,对于生态保护红线区农户是否积极采取有限人为活动,县级政府惩罚力度和人为活动限制补偿资金有负向影响,县级政府监管成本具有负向影响;对于县级政府是否选择实质性监管,生态保护红线区农户的保护成本有正向影响,县级政府惩罚力度和人为活动限制补偿资金有负向影响,但在“生态人”假设博弈模型中,生态保护红线区农户消极(积极)采取有限人为活动获得的生态效益有正向(负向)影响。

An in-depth study of the supervision of human activity restriction compensation in the ecological protection red line area is of great significance to meet the conditions of eco-compensation in the ecological protection red line area.Using the principle of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,this paper constructed the"economic man"hypothetical game model and"ecological man"hypothetical game model between county-level government and farmers in ecological protection red line area.The results show that in the two hypothetical game models,whether farmers actively take limited human activities in the ecological protection red line area has a negative impact on the punishment of county-level government and the compensation fund for human activity restriction,and the supervision cost of county-level government has a negative impact;whether the county-level government chooses substantive supervision or not has a positive impact on the protection cost of farmers in the ecological protection red line area,and a negative impact on the punishment of county-level governments and the compensation funds for human activity restriction.However,in the"ecological man"hypothesis game model,farmers in the ecological protection red line area have a positive(negative)impact on the ecological benefits obtained by taking negative(positive)limited human activities.