基于前景理论的微信健康信息质量三方博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of WeChat Health Information Quality Optimization Based on Prospect Theory

微信中健康信息质量良莠不齐,分析平台、公众号和用户的行为决策演化过程,探究遏制公众号发布虚假信息的关键因素,可为优化健康生态环境提供有益参考。通过构建三方主体演化博弈模型,求解系统均衡点与约束条件,仿真分析主体策略演变的影响因素及系统最优稳定状态。引入前景理论,探究主体的风险态度和损失规避对最优结果的影响。仿真实验得出,平台和用户对风险的敏感性大于损失。相比监管所需的高额成本,平台更注重声誉的提升;相比虚假信息产生的误导,用户着重于满足主观需求。公众号对损失比较敏感,且对平台处罚的敏感性大于粉丝损失。当公众号发布真实信息的初始意愿较低时,平台处罚、媒体曝光等外界因素虽能遏制伪健康信息的传播,但系统最优难以尽快实现。

The quality of health information in WeChat varies from good to bad.Research on the evolutionary process of platform,official account and user behavioral decision-making,explore the key factors that prevent the official account from publi-shing false information,and provide a useful reference for optimizing the health ecological environment.By constructing a three-party game model,system equilibrium points and constraints are solved,then the influencing factors and optimal stable state of the system evolution are simulated and analyzed.Prospect theory is introduced to explore the influence of the subject’s risk attitude and loss aversion on the optimal outcome.Simulation experiments show that the platform and users are more sensitive to risks than losses.Compared with the high cost of supervision,the platform pays more attention to the improvement of reputation.Compared with the misleading caused by false information,users focus on satisfying subjective needs.Official accounts are more sensitive to losses,and the sensitivity to platform penalties is greater than fan losses.When the initial willingness of the official account to release real information is low,although external factors such as platform punishment and media exposure can curb the spread of fake health information,the optimal system is difficult to achieve as soon as possible.