有限产能直销优先策略下双渠道供应链的定价博弈模型

Pricing Game of Dual-channel Supply Chains under the“Capacity for Direct-channel First”Policy

针对产能约束下的双渠道供应链,考虑实际中常用的直销优先分配产能的策略,基于Stackelberg博弈研究制造商(领导者)和零售商(追随者)的定价决策,刻画均衡解并深入分析直销优先策略下产能约束对双渠道供应链利润的影响。研究发现,在不同产能水平下,制造商对两个渠道的依赖程度会发生变化。当产能短缺时,其利润主要源于直销渠道;而当产能相对充足时,其愿意分享更多的产能以换取零售渠道上的批发利润,且此时增大产能可能会损害制造商的利益。对零售商而言,当产能短缺时,其采用高溢价来弥补获得较少产能的劣势;当产能相对充足时,其采用薄利多销的策略来获取更多的利润。当产能过剩时,双方的利润不再受产能的影响,且产能过剩对双方而言不一定是最好的情况。研究结论为制造商的定价与在双渠道中的产能分配策略选择提供有益的管理启示。

With the vigorous development of e-commerce,more and more manufacturers adopt dual-channel marketing to boost demand.However,many manufacturers may have insufficient production capacity due to shortage of fund,insufficient raw materials,equipment failure,complex process and other reasons.Under such circumstances,there is a need for capacity allocation between direct channels and retail channels.The most common allocation policy is that manufacturers give priority to their direct channel,which is called“capacity for direct-channel first”in this paper.Under this policy,the sales volume of both channels will be affected by the prices and capacity simultaneously.As a result,the pricing decisions and the performance of supply chain under this policy require an in-depth investigation.Motivated by this phenomenon,a pricing game model is built for dual-channel supply chains with limited capacity and the impact of“capacity for direct-channel first”policy is analyzed.A stylized model is built to address the Stackelberg type pricing game of a dual-channel supply chain where the manufacturer’s capacity is limited and he adopts a commonly-used allocation policy of“capacity for direct-channel first”.The equilibrium pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer are derived.It is found that there are generally three pricing schemes corresponding to three capacity level(scarce,relatively sufficient,surplus).(i)When the capacity is scarce,the manufacturer’s profit is mainly derived from the direct channel.He relies on the priority policy to control most of the capacity,while the retailer adopts a high premium strategy.In this case,increased capacity is beneficial to both players.(ii)When the capacity is relatively sufficient,the manufacturer is willing to give up some capacity to the retailer in exchange for wholesale profits,and the retailer adopts the“low-margin but high-volume”strategy.In this case,the total channel demand turns out to be equal to the capacity.Moreover,surprisingly,increasing capacity may hurt the manufacturer.(iii)When the capacity is surplus,it has no effect on the players’profits.Moreover,capacity surplus is not necessarily the best situation for the manufacturer or the retailer.The useful managerial implications are provided for manufacturers while making pricing and capacity allocation policy decisions in dual-channel supply chains.