控股股东股权质押融资与上市公司实体投资——融资约束还是市场信息?

Controlling Shareholders’ Pledging Financing and Listed Enterprises’ Real Investments: Financial Constraint or Market Information?

在“十四五”规划提出构建金融有效支持实体经济的体制机制、更好地推动经济高质量发展的大背景下,本文探讨了控股股东股权质押融资这一大股东的重要融资方式,是否以及如何影响上市公司的实体投资。通过创新性地构建控股股东“股权质押融资规模”变量,本文发现,控股股东的股权质押融资会促进企业的实体投资。股权质押融资规模增加1个标准差会使得企业实体投资水平相对于其平均值提高5.76%。通过利用2013年股权质押市场的政策变化,本文借用双重差分模型对内生性问题进行了处理。进一步的分析表明,控股股东质押融资促进企业投资的重要机制为信息渠道而非融资约束渠道。

Under the background of China's 14th Five-year Plan which aims to build an effective financial system in support of the real economy and boost the high-quality economic development,this paper explores whether and how controlling shareholders'share pledge financing,an important financing method for major shareholders,affects the real investment of listed enterprises.By innovatively constructing the variable of“pledging financing cash flow”of controlling shareholders,this paper finds that the pledging financing of controlling shareholders will promote the real investment of enterprises.A one-standard-deviation increase in the size of pledging financing cash flow would lead to a 5.67%increase in enterprises'real investments relative to their average value.By exploiting the policy change in the share pledge market in 2013,we deal with the endogeneity problem by resorting to the difference-in-differences model.Further analysis shows that the underlying mechanism of controlling shareholders'share pledging to promote enterprises'investments is the information channel rather than the financial constraint channel.