破产制度、去杠杆与资本结构动态调整——基于破产法庭设立的研究证据

Insolvency Regimes,Deleveraging and Capital Structure Dynamic Adjustment:Evidence from the Establishment of Bankruptcy Courts

为了有效控制和降低企业的杠杆率,我国政府不断推进法治化、完善市场化机制以提高资源配置效率,其中最具代表性的是设立专门的破产法庭。本文利用我国各地区设立破产法庭的准自然实验,研究设立破产法庭是否会促使企业资本结构动态调整进而达到去杠杆目标。本文发现,破产法庭设立后企业会加快调整尤其是向下调整资本结构。异质性检验结果显示,上述结果主要出现在政府干预得以有效约束、破产管理人制度较为完善、破产司法效率较高的地区,以及破产风险较高和预算硬约束的企业。

In order to prevent financial risks,the regulatory authorities have promoted the rule of law and the market-oriented mechanisms to improve the efficiency of credit resource allocation.For example,China has established its bankruptcy courts.Using the quasinatural experiment of the establishment of bankruptcy courts,this paper explores the role of bankruptcy court in improving dynamic adjustment of capital structure of Chinese listed enterprises and promoting deleveraging.Our main findings are as follows.Enterprises are more likely to increase adjustment speed of capital structure after the establishment of bankruptcy courts,especially when they are over-levered.In addition,through the heterogeneity test,we document a stronger effect for enterprises in pilot cities which integrate an effective constraint of government intervention and cities with a mature bankruptcy administrator system or higher judicial efficiency,and the effect is more pronounced for enterprises with higher bankruptcy risk or hard budget constraints.