地价高估、公共投资与资源错配

Land Price Bubble, Public Investment and Resource Misallocation

地方政府通过土地的出让和抵押为公共投资进行融资,是以土地价格快速上涨为基础的。当前我国住宅和商服用地的价格水平较高,已经超出了基本使用价值,存在高估。本文在资产泡沫理论框架中,引入地方政府土地融资行为和公共投资行为并构建模型,该模型可以产生多重均衡,即土地价格处在基本面的均衡和高于基本面的均衡。高估的土地价格为地方政府提供流动性,放松了融资约束。但地价高估导致了资源错配:公共资本的过度积累和地方政府债务的扩张提高了金融市场利率,潜在地挤出商业投资,抑制产出水平。尽管存在资源错配,但直接刺破高估价值将使地方政府债务失去土地融资的支撑,可能会在短期带来金融系统稳定和地方财政可持续性的两难选择,从而对实体经济带来负面影响。本文讨论了能够平抑地价并兼顾短期稳定和长期效率的宏观审慎政策。

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, along with the shrinking of external demand and the slowdown of industrial growth, local public investment in infrastructure has become the driving force of Chinese economic growth. Meanwhile, local governments’ behaviors of land allocation and land financing have become more complex. In fact, the fundamental support for the large-scale local governments’ land financing and public investment is the soaring land price. As shown in data, the growth of real commercial and residential land price has been rising, much higher than that of industrial land, as well as that of Chinese real GDP. Motivated by the above observations, this paper investigates the following questions. Is there any bubble in China’s soaring land prices? And if there is, how does it influence the macro economy?In the framework of asset bubble theory, this paper introduces local governments’ land financing behavior and public investment behavior with Chinese characteristics. The model can produce multiple equilibra, one with land price bubbles and one without bubbles. The reason why the land price bubbles can exist is the function of liquidity provision. Local governments have strong incentives to increase public investment, but are constrained by the fiscal budget. Land price bubbles can relax the government constraints by increasing land sales and land-collateralized debt financing. However, land price bubbles may not be a gospel for the whole economy. Theoretical analysis at the model’s steady states shows that, relative to the bubbleless equilibrium, business investment is more likely to be crowded out under the bubbly equilibrium. The reason is that land price bubbles increase the value of collateralized land, which expands local governments’ debt and raises the financing cost. What is more, under the bubbly equilibrium, the over-invested public capital suffers from low efficiency problem. If the output elasticity of public capital is not high enough, the positive effect of public capital increment cannot offset the negative effect of business capital that has been crowded out, which eventually leads to resource misallocations and total output depressions. Despite the resource misallocation created by the land price bubbled, puncturing the bubbled is not feasible at all. This paper simulates the dynamic transition path after the bubble burst. It turns out that, although the long-term economy will eventually converge to the more efficient bubbleless steady state, the instant consequence of bubble burst is not as positive as we imagine. After the bursting of the bubbled, local government debts will lose the support of land financing, which would bring about a short-term economic-stability dilemma.On the one hand, if local governments use tax revenue to pay off their debts, the local fiscal sustainability would be threatened. On the other hand, if some local governments default on their debts, the stability of the financial system would be threatened.Both of the above options lead to a negative impact on the real economy and output levels. Therefore, given the existence of land price bubbles, it is necessary to adopt macro-prudential policies. As an illustration, this paper discusses two potential macro-prudential policies, namely, reducing the land collateralizing rate and introducing the expectation of bubble burst. Finally, this paper argues that, in order to suppress the land price bubbles and improve the efficiency of resource allocation, we should take both long-term efficiency and short-term stability into account. In an appropriate policy design, macro-prudential policies should be firstly adopted to gradually suppress the scale of land price bubbles, and when the bubbles are small enough, land price bubbles could be punctured and eliminated by untying the intertwined relationship between local fiscal system and the real estate market.In 2020, against the background of COVID-19, China’s public budget revenue declined, while land transfer revenue and local government debt financing reached new heights. At the same time, manufacturing investment was hit hard, while infrastructure investment bucked up. These facts underscore the important roles played by local governments, land, and public investment. In the new stage of development, in the face of new challenges and opportunities, how could local governments foster China’s economy with the tools of land allocation and land financing, while avoiding the inefficiency and distortion of resource allocation and the accumulation of risks? This paper provides some implications for that.