财政转移支付与地方税收竞争——来自中国县级层面的证据

Fiscal Transfer Payment and Local Tax Competition:Evidence from County Level in China

本文基于我国县级面板数据,通过构建动态空间面板数据模型和非对称反应模型,考察了财政转移支付制度对地区间税收竞争的影响。研究发现,我国存在显著的税收竞争行为,并且以“竞次”特征为主,而转移支付制度整体上能够有效地缓解地方政府间的税收竞争。同时,转移支付的政策效应表现出显著的非线性特征,当转移支付力度过高时,转移支付对地方政府的税收竞争行为没有显著影响。从不同类型转移支付的影响来看,一般性转移支付能够发挥弱化地区间税收竞争行为的作用,税收返还在考虑经济因素后则会加剧地区间的税收竞争,专项转移支付则没有显著影响。机制检验的结果表明,转移支付对地区间财政支出竞争具有显著的激励效应,从而有助于降低地方政府参与税收竞争的力度。本文的研究对于完善中国财政转移支付制度以及引导地区间良性税收竞争具有重要的现实意义。

Based on the county-level panel data in China,this paper examines the impact of the fiscal transfer system on the tax competition among regions by constructing a dynamic spatial panel data model and an asymmetric response model.The results of this paper show that there are significant tax competition behaviors in China,with the main characteristics of“Race to the bottom”,while the fiscal transfer system can effectively alleviate the tax competition among local governments on the whole.At the same time,the policy effects of transfer payment present significant nonlinear characteristics.When the intensity of transfer payment is too high,transfer payment has no significant impact on the tax competition behavior of local governments.From the perspective of the impact of different types of transfer payment,general transfer payment can play a role in weakening tax competition among regions,tax refunds will aggravate tax competition among regions after considering economic factors,and special transfer has no significant impact.The results of the mechanism test show that transfer payment has a significant incentive effect on fiscal expenditure competition among regions,which helps to reduce the intensity of local governments’participation in tax competition.The results of this paper are of great practical significance for perfecting China’s fiscal transfer payment system and guiding benign tax competition among regions.