机构投资者调研与并购绩效——基于信息不对称视角的研究

Institutional Investor’ Corporate Visit and M&A Performance:Based on the Perspective of Information Asymmetry

在国务院多次强调优化并购市场环境的形势下,如何有效借助市场力量以缓解严重的信息不对称问题备受关注。本文以机构投资者调研行为愈发频繁为现实背景,利用2013—2018年深交所上市公司并购数据,采用特定事件研究方法,在甄别调研动因的基础上,实证检验了机构投资者调研对并购绩效的影响及其作用渠道。研究发现,机构投资者针对并购事件发起的调研不仅显著提升了并购事件成功率,也能显著增加并购可实现的财务绩效,并且调研频率越高,提升效果会进一步增加。机制检验表明,机构投资者调研提升并购绩效的积极作用主要通过改善并购事件中市场投资者与上市公司间的信息不对称问题而实现。进一步研究发现,这一积极效应在机构投资者持股比例较低以及信息披露质量较差企业群体中表现更加明显。本文研究为理解“机构调研偏爱并购重组”的市场现象提供了新的启示,也为发展机构投资者以完善资本市场信息披露监管的政策观点提供了实证支持。

In recent years,the scale of China’s M&A market has grown rapidly.As a result,the importance of mergers and acquisitions between enterprises in optimizing the economic structure and improving the efficiency of resource allocation has become increasingly prominent.However,the serious problem of information asymmetry may cause mergers and acquisitions to become a way of improper arbitrage and benefit transmission.After that,it becomes much more difficult for mergers and acquisitions in optimizing the efficiency of economic resource allocation.To solve this problem,the State Council has repeatedly emphasized the importance of domestic M&A market development.However,many administrative measures did not achieve the expected effects.Meanwhile,some administrative measures like a double-edged sword and may cause negative results.Since that,how to effectively use market forces to relieve the serious problem of information asymmetry in the M&A market has attracted much attention.This paper takes the increasing frequency of institutional investors’ corporate visit as a realistic background.Using the 2013-2018 Shenzhen Stock Exchange M&A data of listed companies,this paper adopts the event-study method,based on the screening of institutional investors’ corporate visit motivations,and empirically tests the impact of institutional investor’ corporate visit on M&A performance and its function channel based on the perspective of information asymmetry.The result shows,institutional investor’s corporate visit has increased significantly after the announcement date of M&A events,indicating that M&A events do constitute a motivation for corporate visit.Based on that,the institutional investors’ corporate visit can significantly improve not only the success rate of M&A events,but also the short-term and long-term financial performance of M&A events.And the higher the frequency,the improvement effect will further increase.Mechanism test shows the positive effect of institutional investor’s corporate visit in improving M&A performance is mainly achieved by relieving the information asymmetry in M&A events.In addition,this positive effect is more pronounced in information disclosure low-quality enterprises and corporate groups with a low proportion of institutional investors.This paper may have the following contributions:First,unlike the existing research paradigms,this paper effectively distinguishes the motivations of institutional investors’ corporate visit by using the method of timing analysis.This offers the opportunities to measure the impact of institutional investors’ corporate visit more accurate.This paper providing a new research idea in studying the economic consequences of direct communication between institutional investors and listed company executives.Second,this paper enriched the research content on how market forces can relieve the information asymmetry problems of M&A events.By affirming the economic results of “Institutional Research Prefers M&A and Reorganization” phenomenon,this article also provides relevant theories and empirical support for policy makers on how to use the professional advantages of institutional investors to further improve the efficiency of the domestic M&A market and reduce information asymmetry in M&A events.This paper may also have the following insights:First,the government should continue to improve the management mechanism of institutional investor’ corporate visit activities.Second,the shareholders of listed companies should be encouraged to invite institutional investors to visit the company more frequently.Third,the government also should strengthen the quality of information disclosure of listed companies’ M&A activities.