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弱权即公理--决心对比、选择效应与不对称冲突的结果 被引量:10

Weak Is Might:The Balance of Resolve,Selection Effect,and the Outcome of Asymmetric Conflicts
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摘要 实力优势即权力优势是国际关系的基本常识。根据该常识,不对称冲突中强国获胜概率应当大于弱国获胜概率。但现有不对称冲突研究普遍忽视了对强国与弱国获胜概率的横向比较,因此这种直觉缺乏理论和实证支撑。针对这一空白,作者提出了不对称冲突的决心选择理论。该理论认为,冲突双方的决心对比是决定大多数国际冲突结果的核心因素,强国与弱国实力对比的不对称会导致双方决心对比的反向不对称,而弱国所拥有的相对决心优势又会因选择效应进一步增大,因此在不对称冲突中强国而不是弱国更可能向对方让步。该理论基于国际危机行为数据库1946—2017年数据的统计检验,在一定条件下挑战了“强权即公理”这一国际关系基本常识。除迫使我们反思实力与权力的关系外,决心选择理论还为第二次世界大战后国际安全秩序为何得以保持和延续、大国权力竞争方式为何由武力胁迫转变为利益交换等重要理论和现实问题提供了原创性的解释视角和解释机制。更重要的是决心选择理论提示,国家间互动结果存在现有三大理论范式均未充分注意到的“决心选择”逻辑,这为范式层面的理论创新提供了新的切入点。 It is widely accepted in IR studies that the advantage of strength is the advantage of power,which means that a strong state is more likely to win in an asymmetric conflict than a weak one.However,the existing research on asymmetric conflicts neglects to conduct horizontal comparisons of the probability of winning between strong and weak countries,so this intuition lacks theoretical and empirical support.Aiming at filling this gap,the author puts forward the Resolve-Selection Theory of asymmetric conflict(RST).The theory holds that the balance of resolve between the two sides of the conflict is the core factor that determines the outcome of most international conflicts.The asymmetry of the strength balance between the strong and the weak will lead to the reverse asymmetry of the resolve balance between the two sides,and the relative resolve advantage of the weak will be further increased due to the“selection effect”.Therefore,in asymmetric conflicts,the strong rather than the weak are more likely to give in to the other side.RST has passed the statistical test based on the data of the International Crisis Behavior Database from 1946 to 2017,and to some extent challenges the common sense of“Might is right”.In addition to forcing people to reflect on the relationship between strength and power,RST also provides original perspectives for understanding important theoretical and practical issues such as why the post-World-War-II international security order was maintained,and why the major means of power competition among great powers has changed from coercion to interest exchange.More importantly,RST suggests that there is a“resolve selection”logic that has not been fully noticed by the three existing mainstream paradigms,which provides a novel entry point for theoretical innovation at the paradigm level.
作者 杨原 Yang Yuan(School of International Relations at University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;the Institute of World Economics and Politics at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
出处 《世界经济与政治》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第5期46-76,156,157,共33页 World Economics and Politics
基金 国家社会科学基金一般项目“中美竞合战略第三方因素的影响机制、未来趋势及对策研究”(项目批准号:21BGJ007)的阶段性成果。
关键词 不对称冲突 国际安全秩序 决心对比 权力竞争 选择效应 asymmetric conflicts international security order the balance of resolve power competition selection effect
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