首脑外交中的廉价信号传递及其可信度识别

Cheap Signals and Credibility Screening in Face-to-Face Diplomacy

作为一种特殊的外交沟通形式,面对面的首脑外交具有廉价信号的传递功能。然而主流的外交信号研究忽视了廉价信号的社会互动基础,理性主义与认知主义均难以解释首脑外交的关系性特质。面对面互动中的领导人更容易捕捉对方释放的故意信号与非故意信号,近距离观察内隐的意图信息与情感标志,增进彼此熟悉度。揭示首脑外交的社会互动进程,有助于理解廉价信号的可信度机制。面对多重信号线索的领导人会基于细微印象,综合对比标志与信号、语言信息与非语言信息的匹配性,并用关系性思维识别廉价信号的可信度。1961年赫鲁晓夫与肯尼迪维也纳会晤及1985年戈尔巴乔夫与里根日内瓦会晤的案例分析表明,首脑外交有助于领导人将注意力聚焦于对方的情绪反应,形成一种双向的情感连带。当面对面互动使两国领导人产生情绪共鸣时,他们更容易理解对方的真实意图;当领导人表示愿意为维持互动进程投入时间与精力时,这种互惠性承诺将促进廉价信号的可信度感知。关系主义的信号分析强调,领导人面对面互动形成的情绪共鸣与关系契约,有助于培育和提升国家间信任关系。

Face-to-face communication is a special form of diplomatic interaction that has an important signaling function.However,the existing literature ignores the social relational basis of cheap signals,and neither rationalists nor cognitivists explain the relational foundation of diplomacy interaction.Under what conditions are leaders in faceto-face interactions more likely to believe cheap signals from the other side,and under what conditions are cheap signals in face-to-face diplomacy credible?To explain the logic of cheap signal credibility in face-to-face diplomacy,this paper focuses on the socio-relational processes of diplomatic interaction.Face-to-face diplomacy is the most emotional and dynamic reciprocal processes,in which political leaders embedded in the interactive relationships network compared‘signs’with signals,and verbal and non-verbal messages.Case studies show that despite similar initial conditions at the1961 Khrushchev-Kennedy Vienna Summit and the 1985 Gorbachev-Reagan Geneva Summit,the interaction resulted in different perceptions of cheap signals by leaders.In continuous face-to-face interactions,the two-sides construct‘emotional energy’and‘relational contract’with reciprocal feedback to enhance leaders’perception of the credibility of cheap signals.The“emotional energy”of rhythmic synchronization facilitates the matching of signal cues;the“relational contract”of reciprocal feedback restrains short-sighted opportunistic impulses,thus maintaining leaders’expectations of the credibility of cheap signals.The relationship-oriented explanation framework,which restores to the complex dynamics of diplomatic practice,can help to complement and revise the static logic of mainstream costly signaling theory.