当代知识论中两种确证的优先性之争——以命题的确证和信念的确证为例

The Dispute over the Priority of the Two Kinds of Justification in Epistemology: Take Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification for Example

确证是当代知识论的核心概念,不同流派的确证理论并不等同于对“确证”本身的研究。传统知识论关注的核心是信念的确证,较少讨论命题的确证。主流观点认为,命题的确证是信念的确证的必要条件,前者具有优先性。反对主流观点的学者要么认为信念的确证具有优先性,要么认为二者在优先性问题上是相互交织的。修正主义的版本通过限定“合适的”基础关系来为主流观点提供辩护。文章主张,优先性争论的本质涉及到两类确证的定义问题,最终需要落脚到何种确证与知识相关这一问题。立足于一种修正版本立场,文章认为命题的确证具有优先性,命题的确证是信念的确证的必要条件,单纯的命题的确证不是知识,信念的确证与知识相关。

Justification is the key concept of contemporary epistemology, but the research on different theories of justification is not the same as the study of “justification” itself. Traditional epistemology focuses on doxastic justification, and seldom discusses propositional justification. The mainstream view holds that propositional justification is the necessary condition of doxastic justification, and the former has priority. The opposing theory either holds that doxastic justification has priority or that the two are intertwined in priority. The revised version defends the mainstream opinion by defining the basing relation as “properly”. This paper argues that the essence of the priority debate is the definition of two types of justification, and the ultimate signification is to elaborate which justification is related to knowledge. Based on the revised version of the mainstream view, this paper holds that propositional justification has priority, and propositional justification is the necessary condition of doxastic justification. Propositional justification alone does not constitute knowledge, and doxastic justification is related to knowledge.