资本市场开放对高管超额薪酬的影响——基于陆港通的经验证据

The Impact of Capital Market Opening on Executive Excess Compensation:Based on the Empirical Evidence of Mainland-Hongkong Stock Connect

本文利用2010—2019年我国沪深A股上市公司样本,借助陆港通这一外生事件,利用双重差分模型考察了资本市场开放对高管超额薪酬的影响。研究结果表明,资本市场开放能够有效降低高管超额薪酬,约束高管的自利行为。进一步研究发现,陆港通交易制度发挥治理作用的潜在途径是通过提高股价信息含量产生股价信息反馈效应,促进股价在高管薪酬契约中的指导作用,或者通过改善公司信息环境,降低公司内外部的信息不对称程度,压缩高管超额薪酬的攫取空间。资本市场开放有利于提高高管薪酬契约激励的有效性,但是其对高管超额薪酬的治理作用受到管理者权力的强烈约束。上述研究不仅是对资本市场开放与高管超额薪酬领域研究的有益拓展,而且为我国扩大对外开放、进行相关制度建设与改善公司治理结构提供了政策启示。

Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2019 and the exogenous event of Mainland-Hong Kong Stock Connection,this paper investigates the impact of stock market liberalization on executive excess compensation.The results show that the opening of stock market can effectively reduce executives’excess compensation and restrict executives’self-interest behavior.Further research found that the potential way for Mainland-Hong Kong Stock Connection to play the role of governance is to generate stock price information feedback effect by improving the information content of stock price,promote the guiding role of stock price in executive compensation contract,or reduce the degree of information asymmetry inside and outside the firm and reduce the space for executive excess compensation by improving the firm’s information environment.Stock market liberalization is conducive to improving the effectiveness of executive compensation contract incentive,but its governance effect on executive excess compensation is strongly constrained by managerial power.The above research is not only a beneficial expansion of the research in the field of stock market liberalization and executive excess compensation,but also provides policy enlightenment for China to expand opening-up,carry out relevant system construction and improve corporate governance structure.