网约车平台信息机制设计与司机工作模式选择

Information Mechanism Design in Online Car Hailing Platform and Driver’s Working Strategies

网约车平台乘客目的地透明机制会导致网约车司机产生主动式选单与被动式接单两种工作模式,在社会上引起广泛争议而被取消。本文以滴滴平台上2015年12月北京市网约车司机的随机抽样数据为样本,实证分析乘客目的地透明机制下两种司机工作模式的绩效差异,以及在不同市场需求环境下该绩效差异的变化。运用倾向评分匹配(PSM)的研究方法,本文发现乘客目的地透明机制引发的主动式选单行为会帮助司机获得超额回报。在市场波动的高峰期,主动式选单模式产生的边际收入递减,但是任何市场环境下,司机从被动式接单向主动式选单模式转型总能获得更好的绩效回报。主动式选单模式对司机本人的绩效影响总是正向的,因此司机通过更少的接单获得更高的每日收入、平均每销售收入、更高载客率等。本研究为乘客目的地透明机制的司机行为正向激励效应提供了新的证据,同时也为网约车平台进一步优化司机激励机制提供经验支持。

The customer’s destination information mechanism drive the car drivers into two kinds of working strategy,which is called active order choosing(AOC)and passive order acceptance(POA),and the mechanism is cancelled due to the debate in the society.In this study,we used data from Didi in Dec 2015 to study how drivers’working strategies(AOC vs POA)affect their payoffs,and how does the difference change under different market demand.From PSM analysis,we find that working strategically(AOC)make drivers better off,and the positive effect is diminishing when the market demand is high.We also find that working strategically(AOC)works better no matter how the market demand condition is,and drivers can get higher daily income,hourly income,and higher loading rate when they work strategically.The thrive of mobile car hailing Apps make the way of car hailing being different,for instance,passengers need to send their request on the Apps first,then drivers decide whether to take the order,and drivers can deicide how long to work.This study provides empirical evidence for the positive effect of customer’s destination information mechanism and offer experience for the platform to improve their driver incentive mechanism.