基于前景理论的施工现场安全员与工人监督行为仿真分析

Simulation Analysis of Supervisory Behavior of Construction Site Safety Officers and Workers Based on Prospect Theory

针对监督效果受现场人员监督行为影响的现状,在模型中考虑心理因素,并引入前景理论,利用价值函数分析不同条件下施工现场安全员与工人的最优监督行为。通过计算机模拟仿真,探讨奖惩金额与奖惩力度对演化趋势的影响。结果表明:处罚金额P=10且奖励金额Q=10,处罚力度θ=1且奖励力度φ=1,是该模型下的最优解,此时安全员与工人参与安全监督的积极性最高;当奖惩力度相同时,安全员对于处罚力度的变化表现得更敏感,工人对于奖励力度的变化表现得更敏感。该研究可为施工现场安全员与工人的监督行为分析提供一种新思路。

For the current situation that the supervision effect is affected by the supervision behavior of site personnel,psychological factors are considered in the model,prospect theory is introduced,and value functions are used to analyze the optimal supervision behavior of construction site safety officers and workers under different conditions.The influence of reward and punishment amount and reward and punishment strength on the evolutionary trend is explored through computer simulation.The results showed that:penalty amount P=10 and reward amount Q=10,penalty intensityθ=1 and reward intensityφ=1 is the optimal solution under the model,at this time the highest motivation of safety officers and workers to participate in safety supervision.When the reward and punishment intensity are the same,the safety personnel are more sensitive to the change of penalty intensity and the workers are more sensitive to the change of reward intensity.This study can provide a new idea for the analysis of supervision behavior of safety officers and workers in construction site.