“幻觉论证”与析取论的回应及其问题——以塞尔的知觉理论为角度

The Argument from Illusion and the Disjunctivist defence for Na ve Realism——From the Viewpoint of Searle on Perception

析取论试图为受到“幻觉论证”挑战的朴素的实在论辩护,却在当代复兴了“坏论证”。论文立足于塞尔有关知觉意向性的观点,阐释原本旨在捍卫朴素的实在论的析取论何以滑向了颠倒的坏论证,进而说明塞尔的直接实在论是如何回应坏论证的。

The Disjunctivist defence for Naive Realism against the Argument from Illusion has revived the Bad Argument in contemporary philosophy. Based on Searle’s view on intentionality of perception, this paper aims to explain how Disjunctivism paradoxically defeating its attempts to defend Naive Realism, has turned into a new kind of Bad Argument in an upside-down form;and thus, the paper discusses a different response in the way of Direct Realism proposed by Searle.