论简·班尼特生态哲学中的物质施动性

On the Agency of Things in Bennett's Ecological Philosophy

面临后现代全球困境,西方政治科学研究从科学主义与人本主义转向新唯物主义。新唯物主义指出物质具有内在的施动性,美国当代政治理论家简·班尼特的生态哲学采用“行为体”和“组合体”的概念,把物质施动性置于更广阔的政治生态范畴进行研究,得出物质施事能力具有分散性和联动性的结论。班尼特突破浅生态学和深生态学的认识局限,对环境议题进行更深层的探究,并创造性地提出“生机唯物论”这一概念。将其与马克思历史唯物主义进行比较,结果表明,其理论局限在于没有把唯物主义从物质相态推进到实践形态。

Facing the global-wide postmodern dilemma,the Western political science has experienced a transition from Scientism and Humanism to New Materialism which argues that the agency of things is immanent.The contemporary American political theorist Jane Bennett studies the agency of things in a broader category of political ecology by adopting the concepts of"actant"and"assemblage"and draws the conclusion that the agency of things is distributed and confederate.Breaking through the cognitive limitations of Shallow Ecology and Deep Ecology,Bennett makes further research on environmental issues and creatively puts forward the concept of"vital materialism".By comparing it with Marxist Materialism,this paper claims that the limitation of Bennett's Ecological Philosophy is that it does not push on with Materialism from matter phase to practical form.