董事会连通性与高管薪酬有效性——来自相对业绩评价的经验证据

Board Connectivity and Executive Emolument Effectiveness——Empirical Evidence from Relative Performance Evaluation

委托代理理论认为,相对绩效评价可以从高管的绩效中剥离出共同冲击事项,有利于提高薪酬契约的有效性。本文使用2004—2019年沪深A股非金融类上市公司的数据,采用社会网络分析法和多元统计分析,具体考察董事会连通性是否有助于促进相对绩效评价的使用。研究发现,我国企业对高管薪酬的制定并未广泛使用相对绩效评价方法;董事会连通性抑制了相对业绩评价的使用,这一关系在一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。此外,董事会连通性主要通过降低高管薪酬-业绩敏感性以及增加高管获得的“运气薪酬”影响相对业绩评价的效果。本文的研究结论不仅拓展了相对业绩评价影响因素的研究视角,也将董事网络经济后果的相关研究延伸到了管理会计的研究领域。

According to the principal-agent theory, relative performance evaluation can separate common impact items from executives’ performance, which is beneficial to improving the effectiveness of emolument contracts. Based on the data of non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2004 to 2019, using the social network analysis method and multivariate statistical analysis, this paper specifically examined whether board connectivity could promote the application of relative performance evaluation. It was found that, on the whole, the relative performance evaluation method hasn’t been widely used in the formulation of executive emolument in Chinese enterprises. Besides, board connectivity has inhibited the application of relative performance evaluation, and this relation was still true after robustness test. Further research showed that board connectivity has affected the results of relative performance evaluation mainly through two mechanisms: reducing the sensitivity of executives’ pay-performance and increasing the "luck pay" earned by executives. The conclusions of this paper have not only expanded the research angles of the influencing factors of relative performance evaluation, but also extended the related researches on the economic consequences of directors’ network to the research field of management accounting.