政府补贴下建筑废弃物资源化的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Waste Resource under Government Subsidies

为探究建筑废弃物资源化产业中不同利益相关者之间的合作情况,构建了建筑企业和建筑材料制造商之间的演化博弈模型,研究不同情形下建筑企业和建筑材料制造商的策略选择,探究政府补贴是如何影响双方的决策行为以及政府补贴的合理范围。研究结果表明,增加填埋费用,可以提高建筑企业参与资源化的意愿,进而增大双方合作的概率。政府对双方的成本补贴达到一定程度时,可以促使双方达成合作,且双方的合作力度随着补贴的增大而增强。最后,提出了一些对策建议,为促进我国建筑废弃物资源化利用提供参考借鉴。

To explore the cooperation between different stakeholders in the construction waste recycling industry,evolutionary game approach is used to examine the strategic choices of construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers under different situations,and investigate the influence of government subsidies on the decision-making behaviour of both parties and the corresponding level of government subsidies.The results show that the willingness of construction enterprises to participate in resource can be increased by increasing the cost of landfill,which in turn increases the likelihood of cooperation between the two parties.When the government grants a certain level of cost subsidy to both parties,it will prompt both parties to reach cooperation,and the cooperation of both parties increases with the increase of the subsidy.Finally,some suggestions that will serve as a guide to promote the resource utilization of construction waste in China are presented.