伯德对自然律的倾向论解释探析

On Bird′s interpretation of the Dispositionalism of the law of nature

在对自然律的形而上学追问中,传统的休谟主义经验论无法给自然律稳定的本体论基础。对此的反思,促使阿姆斯特朗将自然律建基于具有同一性的共相性质之上,但由于其坚持以范畴论解释共相性质,导致该方案成为了“二阶休谟主义”。与阿姆斯特朗的范畴论立场相对,伯德坚持倾向一元论,主张以性质作为切入点理解自然律,认为所有性质都作为不可还原的倾向内在于事物,而自然律则是性质的“副现象”,以全称命题的形式出现。肯定性质的倾向论进路,意味着接受一种柏拉图主义式的解释方案,进而能够通过性质的模态特征保有自然律的严格必然性,赋予科学以认识论权威。关注关于自然律的倾向论解释,有可能为自然律的研究带来一些新的启示。

In the metaphysical inquiry of the law of nature, the traditional Humean empiricism can not give a stable metaphysical basis for the law of nature. The reflection on this prompted Armstrong to build the law of nature on the universal of identity. However, because he insists on explaining the universal with Categoricalism, the view of the law has become "second-order Humean". As opposed to the Armstrong′s position of Categoricalism, Bird insists on the dispositional monism, advocates the understanding of the law of nature with property as a starting point, and holds that all properties as irreducible dispositions lie in things, while the law of nature is an "epiphenomenon" and appears in the form of a Universal Statement. The Dispositionalism approach of affirming property means accepting a Platonic interpretation scheme, thus maintaining the strict necessity of the law of nature through the modal characters of property, and endowing science with epistemological authority. Paying attention to the Dispositionalism’s interpretation of law of nature may bring some new enlightenment to the research of law of nature.