信息共享行为下基于随机微分博弈的辟谣效果预测研究

Prediction of Rumor-Refuting Effect Based on Stochastic Differential Game under Information Sharing Behavior

【目的/意义】新媒体环境下,多主体联合辟谣开创了辟谣的新模式。研究信息共享下不同主体的策略选择依赖性,为联合辟谣主体做出科学决策提供理论依据。【方法/过程】考虑外界随机因素的影响和不同信息主体间策略选择的依赖性,建立Stackelberg主从博弈和合作博弈随机微分模型,通过数值仿真,对两种协同模式进行最优均衡分析。【结果/结论】辟谣信息的产生与信息共享的成本、信息共享的边际收益、辟谣信息影响和信息的衰减率有关;合作博弈下信息共享量、系统收益以及辟谣信息产生量的期望和方差都高于Stackelberg主从博弈下的合作模式。【创新/局限】研究为辟谣主体及时采取相应的网络谣言应对措施提供理论支撑,相关结论可为网络谣言的治理和舆情预警提供方法支持。

【Purpose/significance】Under the background of new media,multi-agent joint refuting creates a new mode of refuting rumors.The study of the strategic choice dependence of different subjects under information sharing provides a theoretical basis for the joint subjects to make scientific decisions.【Method/process】Considering the influence of external random factors and the dependence of strategy selection among different information subjects,we established a stochastic differential game model in the two situations of Stackelberg master-slave cooperation and cooperative cooperation.Through numerical simulations,we present the optimal equilibrium analysis of the two modes.【Result/conclusion】The results show that the generation of rumor-refuting information is related to the cost of information sharing,marginal benefits of information sharing,impact of rumor-refuting information and attenuation rate of information.There are four indicators under the cooperative game,including the information sharing volume,the income of the system,the expectation and variance of the generation of rumor-refuting information,which are higher than the Stackelberg master-slave game.【Innovation/limitation】The research provides theoretical support for the subjects of rumor-refuting to take corresponding measures to deal with online rumors in a timely manner.Moreover,the relevant conclusions can provide methodological support for the governance of online rumors and early warning of public opinions.