基于不同TPL权力的电商供应链决策研究

Research on E-commerce Supply Chain Decision Based on Different Supply Chain Powers of Third-Party Logistics Service Provider

第三方物流企业受到政府补贴的大力扶持,物流服务显著提升,对消费者网购产生积极影响,逐渐享有供应链话语权。通过分析物流服务供应商的物流成本结构,分别考虑物流投资与物流成本函数,从第三方物流供应链权力视角构建三种电商供应链物流外包权力结构场景(物流服务商主导模式、物流服务商次主导模式和物流服务商跟随模式),综合研究第三方物流企业权力对电商物流外包供应链决策的影响。结果表明,当物流服务商权力越小时,物流服务水平、市场规模、制造商利润和网络零售商利润越大。而不同权力结构下的批发价格、零售价格、物流服务商利润关系受到物流投资系数和物流配送费用的共同影响。当满足条件时,物流服务商跟随模式使得供应链实现帕累托最优。不同第三方物流企业处于不同权力地位时,供应链利润均随物流配送费用的增加、物流投资系数的增加,物流成本系数的减小而增加。据此对不同的物流补贴政策效果进行分析,并为政策制定者和供应链主体提供参考性意见。

Strongly supported by government subsidies, third-party logistics companies significantly improve logistics services to attract online orders for the right to speak in e-commerce supply chain. By analyzing cost structure of third-party logistics service provider, the total logistics cost is broken down into fixed investment cost and variable operation cost. Logistics service affects both market demand and variable operation cost. In our model, three power structure scenarios are considered based on different supply chain powers of third-party logistics service provider, namely service provider dominant mode, logistics service provider vice-dominant mode and logistics service provider following mode, to examine the impact of power structure on supply chain decision-making. Our results reveal that the power of third-party logistics service provider does have an influence on supply chain decisions in e-commerce logistics outsourcing supply chain. Specifically, the smaller power the third-party logistics service provider has, the greater the logistics service level, market size, manufacturer profit and online retailer profit would be. Besides, wholesale price, retail price, and logistics service provider’s profit relationship under different power structures are jointly affected by the logistics investment coefficient and logistics distribution costs. Under certain conditions, the e-commerce logistics outsourcing supply chain reaches Pareto optimal solution. In addition, decreasing logistics service investment coefficient and increasing logistics service cost coefficient and unit logistics charge can positively enhance the logistics service level, market demand and profits of the manufacturer and e-retailer. Based on sensitivity analysis, the functions of two types of government subsidy incentives are studied so that suggestions can be provided for policy makers and supply chain parties.