产业技术创新联盟创新合作演化博弈分析——基于大数据辅助监管视角

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Industrial Technological Innovation Alliance Innovation Cooperation--From the Perspective of Big Data Assisted Supervision

创新主体和监管主体反复博弈、不断学习和调整策略的过程,构成了产业技术创新联盟监管的复杂系统。本文在基于微观主体有限理性假设的基础上,构建了产业技术联盟创新合作监管演化博弈模型,讨论了大数据辅助创新合作监管的演化过程、稳定点和政策制定切入点。研究结果表明:通过建立良好的制度保证创新主体合作“绩效”大于不合作“补贴”,可以使得大数据以弱监管的方式辅助创新合作监管,长期来看可以通过增加不合作处罚、提高失职处罚率来实现,这是创新合作监管的根本所在,大数据监管成功率的提高能够实现创新合作监管“技术赋能”,从而有效降低不合作“补贴”。本文为促进产业技术创新联盟健康发展提供借鉴和理论支撑。

The process of repeated game,continuous learning and adjustment of strategies between innovation subjects and supervision subjects constitutes a complex system of innovation alliance supervision.Based on the assumption of bounded rationality of micro subjects,an evolutionary game model of innovation cooperation supervision of industrial technology alliance is constructed in this paper,and the evolution process,stability point and policy-making entry point of big data assisted innovation cooperation supervision are discussed.The research results show that,establishing a good system can ensure that the“performance”of innovation subject cooperation is greater than the“subsidy”of non-cooperation,which can make big data assist innovation cooperation supervision in the way of weak supervision,it is the root of innovation cooperation supervision.In the long run,it can be achieved by increasing non-cooperation punishment and the rate of dereliction of duty punishment.The success rate of big data supervision improvement can realize the innovative cooperation supervision“technical empowerment”,so as to effectively reduce the“subsidy”of non-cooperation,which provides reference and theoretical support for promoting the healthy development of industrial technology innovation alliance.