国有企业债转股运作:一个博弈观点

Operation of Debt-to-equity Swaps in State-owned Enterprise: a Game Theory's Viewpoint

在不改变国有经济主体产权结构现状的条件下 ,债转股运作是在信息不对称时有关利益主体追求自身效用最大化和争夺金融资源支配权而展开的利益冲突与斗争的博弈过程 ;债转股的运作 ,既包括实施前有关各方债转股谈判博弈 ,也包括债转股实施后有关债转股协议执行过程的股息支付和股权回购监督博弈。利用博弈论原理 ,构造银行与国有企业债转股博弈模型以及债转股后资产管理公司与国有企业关于债转股协议执行的监督博弈模型。研究结果表明 ,在一定条件下 ,企业与银行之间能够达成一种混同均衡而使债转股协议达成 ;并且 ,为保证按期得到股息支付和股权回购 ,资产管理公司应该树立强硬形象 ,监控债转股企业的财务与经营管理。

Operation of Debt to equity Swaps are thought to be a game process of conflict of interest when concerned interest groups seek furthest uses of them and dispute eminent domain of financial resources if state owned enterprise's property right configuration is not to be changed. That is to say, operation of swaps of debt to equity is one game between commercial bank and state owned enterprise firstly, and then it is another game of actualizing contract between AMC and stated owned enterprise. So the corresponding models are constructed according to game theory. The result indicates that enterprise and bank can compass an equilibrium and come to an agreement of swaps of debt equity. Nay, AMC must build up hawkish visualize to supervise and control enterprise's financial affairs and management in order to gain dividend and rights of section is bought back.