地方环境保护压力、国有股权与银行信贷投放——基于我国城市商业银行的实证研究

Pressure on Local Environmental Protection,State Ownership and Bank Credit Allocation——An Empirical Study Based on City Commercial Banks in China

以我国2008—2015年城市商业银行为样本,本文探讨了政绩考核体系转变的背景下,政府干预对银行信贷资金配置的影响。结果表明,地方环境保护压力能够促进城市商业银行环境贷款的投放,国有股权对二者的关系能够起到正向的调节作用。量化的环境绩效考核体系已经开始发挥作用,并显著增强了地方环境保护压力对银行信贷资金配置的影响,没有证据表明地方经济增长压力会影响地方政府干预对银行环境贷款的促进作用。进一步分析表明,地方环境保护压力的影响仅存在于政府干预程度更高的银行中,这与环境类贷款并不能在短期内带来城市商业银行经济绩效的增加有关。本文提供了环境绩效考核体系下地方政府如何影响银行信贷资金配置的证据,并验证了环境考核体系的作用。

This paper uses China’s city commercial banks’operating data from 2008 to 2015 as sample to explore the impact of government intervention on the allocation of bank credit funds in the context of the transformation of the government performance evaluation system.The results show that the pressure on local environmental protection can compel city commercial banks to grant loans for environmental proection,and the proportion of local government ownership can positively moderate the relationship between the pressure and the loan granting.The government environmental performance evaluation system strengthens the impact of local environmental pressure on bank environmental lending.There is no evidence that the pressure of economic growth will affect the role of local government intervention in promoting bank environmental loans.Further analysis shows that the impact of local environmental protection pressure only exists in banks with high government intervention,which is related to the fact that environmental loans cannot increase the economic performance of city commercial banks.This paper provides evidence of how local governments affect the allocation of bank credit funds under the environmental performance evaluation system,and shows that the environmental performance evaluation system has begun to play a role.