非对称信息条件下创业企业融投资行为博弈分析

Under Dissymmetrical Information the Game Theoretical Analysis about the Investment Financing Behavior of the Enterprises

运用博弈论的思想和方法 ,利用委托代理理论来揭示非对称信息条件下 ,资本市场上监管机构、股东与创业企业之间不能形成有效合作的机理 ,探索合作的条件和决定因素。分析得知 :只有通过提高对提供虚假信息的处罚力度以及提高提供真实信息所得的收益 ,才能使得创业者提供虚假信息的积极性降低 ,监管机构检查的必要性也会降低 ,从而形成创业企业竞相提供真实信息 ,减少虚假信息泛滥的良性循环 ,并对创业企业资本市场的建立和完善提出若干建议。

The authors use the ideas and methods of the game theory to reveal that, under the condition of dissymmetrical information, it can't form an effective cooperative relationship among supervisor organization, the shareholders and the enterprises. In the capital market, we explain the cooperative conditions and determinants researched. Only through strengthening the force of punishment towards providing the false information and increasing the benefit received by providing the real information, the enthusiasm of the founders' providing the false information drops, and the necessity of the supervisor organization's checking decreases. Finally, we give some suggestions about the construction and consummating of the capital market of the enterprise.