抵押担保在信贷合约中的经济意义

Economic Sense of Mortgage and Guarantee in Credit Contract

银行和借款企业之间存在着信息不对称 ,这种信息不对称可能产生逆向选择问题。研究在对称信息下银企双方之间如何构造最优合同。指出在信息不对称的情况下 ,贷款银行根据信贷市场上借款企业的平均风险类型所制定的贷款价格如何产生逆向选择问题。研究了抵押担保在信贷合同的作用 ,指出担保有一定的信号显示作用 ,有利于贷款银行识别借款企业的风险类型 ,抵押可以减小贷款银行在违约情况下的损失并扩大借款企业的责任范围。在定量的基础上 ,指出可以设计贷款担保与贷款偿付负相关的贷款合约识别借款企业的风险类型 ,从而实现资金的最优配置和效用的极大化。

There exists the information asymmetry between banks and enterprises that need loan, which can cause the problem of adverse selection. With the symmetry information, banks and enterprises can manage to reach best contracts. However, with the information asymmetry, when banks select the price of loan according to the average risk level of borrowers, the problem of adverse selection appears. Mortgage and guarantee are all very helpful to deal with adverse selection in some sides. For example, guarantee can send a signal to banks that enterprises could be low risky, and mortgage can make highly risky enterprises give up borrowing since it will bear more responsibility for its fail. A form of contract that connects the price of loan with the value of mortgage can help to recognize the style of different borrowers.