内部与外部薪酬差距——激励有效性之比较及互动

Internal-and External-Firm Pay Gap: The Comparison and Interaction of Incentive Effectiveness

内部和外部薪酬差距是员工薪酬比较的两个重要方面,但已有大多数研究均孤立地考察它们的激励效应,对于二者的互动关系和作用边界缺乏足够的关注。本研究以A股工业类企业为例,比较分析了这两方面薪酬差距的创新激励效果及其互动关系。研究发现:(1)单独来看,内外两方面的薪酬差距对企业创新效率均有显著影响,当将二者结合分析后,内部薪酬差距的抑制作用依然显著,外部薪酬差距的正向激励作用不再显著。为控制内生性,采用联立方程模型中的三阶段最小二乘法进行回归,结论一致。(2)薪酬差距的激励作用存在异质性。具体来看,在非国有企业以及薪酬水平较低的企业中,内部薪酬差距的作用不显著,而外部薪酬差距能够显著促进企业创新效率的提升;在国有企业以及薪酬水平较高的企业中则正好相反,内部薪酬差距对企业创新效率有显著的抑制作用,而外部薪酬差距的作用不显著。本文拓展和丰富了薪酬激励和企业创新激励领域的研究,并对现实企业决策具有较强的启示意义。

Both internal-and external-firm pay gap are the two important aspects of employee compensation comparison. However, most of the existing literature has studied the incentive effect of internal-and external-firm pay gap separately, and paid insufficient attention to the combination, interaction and boundary between the two.Based on the samples of A-share industrial listed companies in China, the incentive effect and interactive relationship between internal-and external-firm pay gap are analyzed. The results show that:(1) Both internal-and external-firm pay gap have significant influences on corporate innovation efficiency separately. When integrating the two facts in one model, the inhibiting effect of internal-firm pay gap on corporate innovation efficiency is still significant, while the positive incentive effect of external-firm pay gap becomes insignificant. In order to control endogenous problem, the three-stage least square method in simultaneous equation model is used for regression,and the results are consistent with the above.(2) About the incentive effect of pay gap, there are significant differences in different types of enterprises. Specifically, in non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises with low salary level, internal-firm pay gap plays no significant role, while external-firm pay gap can significantly promote the improvement of corporate innovation efficiency. In state-owned enterprises and enterprises with high salary level, it is exactly the opposite. Internal-firm pay gap has a significant inhibiting effect on corporate innovation efficiency, while external-firm pay gap has no significant effect. Thus the research on compensation and corporate innovation incentive is expanded and enriched and has a strong enlightenment significance to the actual enterprise decision-making.