摘要
理解康德的“审美无利害”命题涉及对其核心词义的分析,及其与“鉴赏判断”的关系。在核心词义方面,汉语康德学界几位学者将ästhetisch译为“审美的”“感悟的”或“感性的”。对照中文与康德的文本,可将其看作三个角度:“审美的”考虑到了中文与德文语境中对“思维方式”的侧重,“感悟的”看到了康德在人的各种能力间揭示出的关联性,“感性的”直接指出了审美与鉴赏的本质。且三种角度结合才可兼顾康德之审美与鉴赏的过程性意义。“感性的”“审美的”与“感悟的”是主体审美与鉴赏的三个阶段性特征,三者是后者包容前者的关系。现今将Interesse译为“利害”或“兴趣”,亦不能完全兼顾康德的原义,也造成了对“审美无利害”与鉴赏判断是否产生、带有兴趣的讨论;根据康德原文“兴趣”与“愉悦”的关系,可知鉴赏判断与“审美无利害”的关系:前者在经验层面上虽能产生“鉴赏的兴趣”,却只是强调“鉴赏”本身,而非指向对对象“实存”的兴趣,因而,后者仍然成立。
Understanding Kant’s“aesthetic without interest”proposition involves the analysis of its core word meaning,and the combing of its relationship with“appreciation and judgment”.In terms of the core word meaning,several Chinese scholars have translated ästhetisch as“aesthetic”or“perceptual”.Comparing Chinese to Kant’s original text,it can be regarded as three aspects:“aesthetic”considers the emphasis on“way of thinking”in the Chinese and German context,and“perceptual”(ganwu)sees the correlation of Kant in various human abilities,“perceptual”(ganxing)directly points out the nature of aesthetics and appreciation.The combination of three aspects can take into account the process significance of aesthetic or appreciation.They are the stage characteristics of this process.In addition,the current translation of interesse as“interest”(lihai)or“interest”(xingqu)can not fully consider Kant’s original thoughts,even cause the discussion of“no interest in aesthetics”that whether“appreciation”with interest.According to the relationship between“interest”and“pleasure”,we can see that the appreciation judgment and“aesthetic interest”can produce“appreciation interest”,but only emphasizes“appreciation”itself,rather than an interest in the object.
作者
夏兴才
王雪柔
XIA Xingcai;WANG Xuerou
出处
《海峡人文学刊》
2022年第2期27-34,156,共9页
Journal of Humanities Across the Straits